Is China willing and able to pull the US out of the quagmire of the Iran war?
TEHRAN — President Donald Trump’s three-day state visit to China begins under the heavy shadow of the ongoing crisis in the Persian Gulf. More than 70 days into the joint US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, the conflict has settled into a precarious stalemate, thrusting Beijing into the role of a critical diplomatic actor.
Upon his arrival in Beijing on Wednesday night, Trump was received by Chinese Vice President Han Zheng and other senior officials—a clear signal of Beijing’s adherence to diplomatic protocol, even as the two powers remain sharply divided over the path to regional stability.
Shortly before departing Washington, Trump signaled his desire for a “long talk” with President Xi Jinping on the Iran conflict, while simultaneously asserting that the United States does not need outside help. This public posture contrasts with signals from his own cabinet. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has urged China to use its influence to pressure Iran into reopening the Strait of Hormuz, while Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent confirmed that Iran tops the agenda at this summit—the first of its kind since 2017.
Against this backdrop, the May 6 visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to Beijing—his first since hostilities began on February 28—carries significant weight. Following high-level talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, it is evident that Tehran is reinforcing its strategic alignment with Beijing. Araghchi endorsed China’s four-point peace proposal for the Middle East, which emphasizes peaceful coexistence, respect for sovereignty, adherence to international law, and the coordination of development and security.
Wang, while stressing the urgent need for dialogue and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, resisted US calls to isolate Tehran. Instead, he underscored the necessity of a permanent, negotiated end to the conflict.
The war itself has evolved from the initial kinetic strikes of March and early April into a high-pressure phase characterized by blockade diplomacy. Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remains severely disrupted, with Iran expanding operational oversight across a broader maritime zone. The April 8 ceasefire, brokered by Pakistan, has failed to secure a lasting peace. The conflict now resembles a sustained game of brinkmanship, as Iran refuses negotiations until Washington meets five core demands: ending hostilities on all fronts, particularly Israel’s war on Lebanon; lifting sanctions; releasing frozen Iranian assets; compensating Iran for war damage; and recognizing Iran’s sovereign rights over the Strait of Hormuz.
Beyond the battlefield, the economic repercussions are mounting. Instability in the Persian Gulf has pushed oil prices above $100 per barrel, fueling renewed inflationary pressures worldwide. For Trump, this surge poses domestic political risks, as energy-driven inflation threatens economic growth and complicates his administration’s broader policy agenda.
At the strategic level, the implications extend far beyond the Middle East. Despite initial US assumptions that the conflict would trigger a Venezuela-style collapse of Iranian state structures, Iran’s military resilience has derailed any rapid regime-change scenario. A decisive US victory over Iran would free Washington to redirect its strategic focus toward China—particularly Taiwan, which Beijing considers a core red line. This concern is reinforced by a broader pattern of US strategic rhetoric, including references to Venezuela, Greenland, and Canada in discussions of American geopolitical ambitions. From this perspective, any American upper hand in Iran could directly reshape the broader balance of power in Asia. In this context, China should continue to support Iran at the UN Security Council and firmly reject calls to weaken or abandon its position, while maintaining a clear stance in favor of Iran’s sovereignty and the need for a negotiated end to the conflict.
Yet this interpretation is not universally shared. Some analysts contend that prolonged US entanglement in the Middle East may actually serve China’s interests. A drawn-out conflict forces Washington to expend substantial military and financial resources, limiting its ability to intensify pressure in the Indo-Pacific. In this view, a protracted stalemate buys Beijing valuable strategic time while allowing it to maintain diplomatic distance from the fighting.
In the end, for China, the main question is not only whether the United States wins or loses in Iran, but whether the war ends quickly or turns into a prolonged conflict. In either case, China is in a position to play a constructive mediation role and support efforts toward a negotiated political solution. This would help stabilize the region while also strengthening China’s role as a responsible global power. The outcome will also shape China’s position in the world and the future balance of major-power relations.
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