TEHRAN - The United States and the Zionist regime launched the recent war on Iran with the objectives of changing the regime, fragmenting Iran, and seizing its oil resources. By combining military pressure, economic sanctions, psychological operations, and efforts to destabilize the country internally, they believed they could break the will of the Iranian nation.

However, the steadfastness of the vigilant and resilient Iranian people, the courage of the armed forces, and the effective leadership of the Supreme Leader, together with the efforts of all state institutions, reversed the situation. Not only did the aggressors fail to achieve their goals, but many of the region’s strategic equations were fundamentally altered.

What Iran’s foes failed to understand in their calculations was the revolutionary leadership’s spirit of sacrifice, the determination of senior military commanders, national cohesion, the deterrent capabilities of the armed forces, and the Islamic Republic’s strategic capacities. A project that was intended to shift the balance of power against Iran ultimately became a catalyst for redefining the regional balance of power itself.

Today, developments in West Asia represent far more than a series of military confrontations or diplomatic exchanges. They signal the region’s entry into a new phase of redefining power balances and the security architecture. In this context, events in Lebanon, the indirect negotiations between Iran and the U.S., the growing role of regional actors, and developments surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb all constitute pieces of a larger puzzle. The central issue is not merely war or peace, but the determination of the future political and security rules governing the region.

Numerous indications suggest that Washington’s primary objective has been to prevent the conflict from escalating into a full-scale regional war—one that could seriously threaten energy security, the global economy, and American interests throughout the region. At the same time, public opinion pressures, the economic costs of war, and domestic political considerations have compelled the White House to pursue crisis management and de-escalation.

In such an environment, the fragile ceasefire that has emerged cannot be interpreted as the end of the conflict or the establishment of lasting peace. Recent weeks and months have demonstrated that while the U.S. and the Zionist regime speak of negotiations and de-escalation on the one hand, they simultaneously seek to alter realities on the ground through violations of agreements, increased pressure, and the continuation of hostile actions.

Repeated Israeli attacks on Lebanon, allegedly carried out with American approval, violations of Iranian territory, the continuation of economic blockades, and political pressure through international institutions all indicate that the enemy remains committed to weakening the Axis of Resistance and extracting concessions through pressure as part of a strategy of “negotiation under fire.”

Such an approach is neither compatible with the principles of the Islamic Republic nor consistent with the logic of diplomacy, and it is unlikely to succeed.

From Iran’s strategic perspective, Lebanon constitutes an integral component of the region’s deterrence architecture and a pillar of stability against the expansionist policies of the Zionist regime. Supporting Lebanon as a strategic ally—one that also assisted Iran during the Ramadan War—is a red line from which Iran will not retreat. For this reason, the Islamic Republic has consistently maintained that any ceasefire or agreement must encompass all fronts, particularly Lebanon. Iran considers the cessation of hostilities in Lebanon to be one of the essential conditions for any potential understanding with the U.S.

Nevertheless, a key question remains: why did Iran decide to assume a more active role at this particular juncture?

The answer lies in the efforts of the U.S. and Israel to advance a model in which military, security, and economic pressures are continuously applied without ever being formally defined as a full-fledged war. Under this model, the opposing side is simultaneously sanctioned, threatened, subjected to attacks, and expected to remain at the negotiating table. Yet recent experience has demonstrated that this calculation is fundamentally flawed when it comes to Iran. The Islamic Republic will neither accept an imposed war nor submit to imposed negotiations.

Accepting such a situation would inevitably have resulted in a gradual shift in the balance of power to the detriment of the Iranian nation and the resistance front. Consequently, within the framework of its inherent right to self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Islamic Republic decided to prevent the consolidation of this equation.

Iran’s response was not merely a military action; it carried a strategic message. That message was clear: Lebanon is not separate from the region’s security calculations, Beirut’s southern suburbs are not outside the battlefield, and the enemy cannot assume that limited but continuous actions will allow it to impose new rules upon the region. For this reason, the significance of recent developments extends far beyond their military dimension and conveys an important strategic message. The concept of the “unity of fronts” is no longer merely a political slogan; it has become an operational reality.

Over the past years, some believed it would be possible to divide the resistance front—separating Lebanon from Iran, Yemen from Lebanon, Bab el-Mandeb from Hormuz, and portraying regional resistance movements as isolated actors. However, realities on the ground have disproved this assumption. Today, from the Strait of Hormuz to Bab el-Mandeb, and from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea, a new regional order is taking shape. This order is founded upon the principle that regional security is indivisible, and that any adventurism against one component of this system can generate consequences far beyond its immediate geography.

Within this framework, a network of geopolitical factors stretching from Hormuz to Bab el-Mandeb has emerged, capable of influencing global trade, energy security, and the strategic calculations of major powers. This reality constitutes an important element of Iran’s strategic capacity within the region’s evolving equations.

Meanwhile, alongside military pressures, the political campaign against Iran has continued. The recent resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), coinciding with heightened military pressure, forms part of the broader pattern described above. There is little doubt that certain international institutions have drifted away from their professional mandates and have become instruments of political pressure against Iran.

When a country’s peaceful nuclear facilities are attacked and, instead of condemning the aggressor, pressure is directed against the victim, claims of neutrality on the part of international institutions begin to resemble a bitter irony. Nevertheless, Iran has consistently demonstrated its commitment to reason, dialogue, and political solutions. What Iran rejects is not negotiation itself, but the exploitation of diplomacy and international institutions as tools of coercion.

Accordingly, the strategy of the Islamic Republic rests upon a clear principle: we will abandon neither the battlefield nor diplomacy. Experience has shown that these are not separate paths but complementary components of national power. Defensive strength enables negotiations from a position of authority, while diplomacy transforms achievements on the ground into lasting political outcomes. We employ diplomacy when appropriate and rely upon deterrent power when necessary.

Ultimately, what is unfolding in the region today may be described as a “negotiation of swords”—a situation in which dialogue and hard power simultaneously shape one another. The U.S. seeks to achieve its objectives through a combination of diplomatic engagement and pressure on the ground, increasing the costs of failing to reach an agreement. Iran, however, relying on its inherent right to self-defense, its deterrent capabilities, regional strategic depth, and geopolitical leverage, has demonstrated that it is both powerful on the battlefield and confident at the negotiating table. It neither seeks war nor will it surrender under pressure.

From Hormuz to Bab el-Mandeb, and from Lebanon to the Persian Gulf, the new reality of the region is that security is indivisible. No durable political or security order can emerge without recognizing Iran’s role, the realities on the ground, and the rights of the peoples of the region. The Islamic Republic, acting from a position of strength while safeguarding its national security and strategic interests, will not be a passive participant but one of the principal architects of the new regional order—an order in which no lasting agreement can endure without acknowledging realities on the ground, regional collective security, and mutual respect among the countries of the region.

(This article was originally published by the Etemad newspaper on June 14)