It has been about three months since Iran and Saudi Arabia cut their diplomatic relationship after Saudi execution of Shia religious leader Nimu al-Nimr and the subsequent event of an attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran in January. International society has grown its concern with a possibility of military escalation since then.

The further development that Turkey and Saudi Arabia threatened to launch ground operations in Syria in the middle of February also raised a future possibility of military confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Syria.  Will Iran and Saudi Arabia have a military confrontation in the near future?  Is there any prospect for the restoration of the relationship between the two states soon? 

There are at least two key elements that have shaped and will impact the future Iran-Saudi relationship.  One is Iran’s role in Geneva negotiations.  After the surprise declaration of Russia’s withdrawal from Syria, President Assad seems to feel much pressure to make concessions in the Geneva peace talks. Many observers have pointed out that behind the sudden evaluations of Russia from Syria may have been an agreement between the U.S. and Russia to promote political solutions in Syria.  Now that the Assad forces’ victory over the recapture of Palmira is in scope, the U.S. allied states of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, that could not make much progress in the Syrian campaigns, are finding it difficult to obstruct the UN efforts to settle the Syria crisis politically.  If Iran can play a significant role in this political process, political settlements will gradually be made though it may take some time to completely achieve it. 

The other element is actually Iran’s domestic governance, how the Rouhani government can handle economic problem.  With the prospect of the continued low oil price that will not easily exceed $50 per barrel in the next six months, both Iran and Saudi Arabia continuously need to tackle economic challenges. For Iran to manage its economy, it goes without saying that Tehran has to implement the JCPOA so that oil and gas related economic sanctions can be lifted. To achieve this goal, the government needs to maneuver domestic politics in which those who oppose the improvement of Iran-U.S. relationship attempt to obstruct the implementation of the JCPOA. The result of the recent two elections indicated that the Rouhani government has overall received much support despite the fact that the second round of the Majlis election may turn out to be divided fairly between Rouhani supporters and Rouhani oppositionists.

Iran has already given many signals to Saudi government to improve the relationship.  Yet, Saudi Arabia’s conditionality has been said that Iran would stop its “interventions” in Yemen, Bahrain, Iraq and Syria, which will not be easily agreed by Iran.  Whether this conditionality continues or not depends on how the Syria crisis will be handled politically and how Iraq’s stability will be further maintained.  With the scope that both Syrian and Iraqi situations will take some time to settle down, it is likely that the restoration of the Iran-Saudi relationship may take time, too.  What is most needed now is Iran’s government’s ground work and preparation for the more effective economy partly which can be pursued through economic related bills to reform economic systems.